- clo-devel - mailman3.common-lisp.net

Re: [clo-devel] Re: Please upload your public GPG key to common-lisp.net
by Erik Enge 11 Nov '03

11 Nov '03

Marco Baringer <mb(a)bese.it> writes: > ok, so this "guarntees" that the key belongs to whevere has access to > that account (which is good), but how do you get people to trust > common-lisp.net's key? am i missing something simple? I'm guessing that when you send me your public key to register for a project and I reply with your password in an encrypted email (signed with the common-lisp.net key), you import the common-lisp.net key and sign it and then use it to verify the keyring whenever you need to. Does that sound like a plan? We should also publish it's fingerprint on the website. Erik.

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Re: [clo-devel] Re: Please upload your public GPG key to common-lisp.net
by Erik Enge 11 Nov '03

11 Nov '03

Mario Mommer <mommer(a)igpm.rwth-aachen.de> writes: > Some redundancy would certainly be good. In case something bad happens > we would have to hack your box to run the site, btw. Good point. I will tell you and Nikodemus the root password plus the passphrase for the common-lisp.net private key (once I've created it). Should we also perhaps distribute a key-revocation certificate for the common-lisp.net key just in case it gets out in the wild? Erik.

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Re: [clo-devel] Re: Please upload your public GPG key to common-lisp.net
by Erik Enge 11 Nov '03

11 Nov '03

Nikodemus Siivola <nikodemus(a)random-state.net> writes: > Need To Know Basis, of course. As long as you're willing to shoulder > the signing, no-one else needs to know. If you think you need help, > then someone else as well. I don't think I need help but if I get hit by the bus you're out of luck. I think perhaps telling a couple of you will be appropriate. How's this for the website: We want users and developers who download software from this site to have a way of verifying that what they just downloaded is indeed what the author uploaded and that the author who uploaded the software indeed is the author they think he is. This will help in preventing trojaned software to spread. For the user to verify a software package (usually a tarball or a zip file), the author will need to sign said package use his <a href="http://www.gnupg.org/">GPG</a> (or <a href="http://www.pgp.com/>PGP</a> or similar technology) private key. (For details on how to do this, check out the GnuPG site, for example, which has several howto's and other useful documents.) Once the package has been signed, the user can then download the package pluss the author's public key and verify that the public key at hand signed the package he or she just downloaded. The weak link is of course that the user doesn't know if the public key is the author's or not. Here's where our signing policy comes into play. When developers apply for a project at common-lisp.net they receive their passwords encrypted (by mail) and if they successfully decrypt and answer the email, their public key will be signed by the common-lisp.net keymaster. Thus, the users will have a means of verifying that they have the correct key. Poorly worded but does this capture our intent? Erik.

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[clo-devel] Terminated Account
by Billy Fountain 10 Nov '03

10 Nov '03

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[clo-devel] Re: Payment Past Due, account
by Alvaro Miles 10 Nov '03

10 Nov '03

1 0

Re: [clo-devel] Re: Please upload your public GPG key to common-lisp.net
by Erik Enge 07 Nov '03

07 Nov '03

Kevin Rosenberg <kevin(a)rosenberg.net> writes: > I'd recommmend keymaster(a)cl.net and have a web page which describes > the criteria for a key to be signed by the keymaster key. (I'd reserve > you signing keys with your personal key for those owners with whom you > meet in person and look at their photo id. It looks like this is the best approach. Since I'm not the most experienced with these things around here, I'll ask: do we want the key to just sign (no password) or to sign and encrypt/decrypt (then we need a password, if I understand correctly)? Erik.

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Re: [clo-devel] Re: Please upload your public GPG key to common-lisp.net
by Erik Enge 07 Nov '03

07 Nov '03

Nikodemus Siivola <nikodemus(a)random-state.net> writes: > Imagine: somehow the key gets stolen. Now the purveyor of the key can > sign stuff as Common-lisp.net, including keys of maliscious package > authors, which people will then install and run because the author's > key was trusted by Common-lisp.net... Ok, good point. So, who gets to know the key, then? Erik.

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[clo-devel] Re: Please upload your public GPG key to common-lisp.net
by Erik Enge 06 Nov '03

06 Nov '03

Kevin Rosenberg <kevin(a)rosenberg.net> writes: > Did I understand correctly that you'll be signing public keys that are > used are the common-lisp.net server? Yes. > If so, are you planning on signing them with your personal key or an > administrative, common-lisp.net key? Good question. What say you others? I think it sounds like a good idea to have an administrative common-lisp.net key. Erik.

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Re: [clo-devel] Re: Please upload your public GPG key to common-lisp.net
by Erik Enge 06 Nov '03

06 Nov '03

Erik Enge <erik(a)nittin.net> writes: > Good question. What say you others? I think it sounds like a good > idea to have an administrative common-lisp.net key. Noone has disagreed with this so I'm going to assume they agree. What would be appropriate for this key with regards to real name and email address? "Common-Lisp.net Administrative Key" and "admin(a)common-lisp.net" perhaps? Erik.

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[clo-devel] "authentication"
by Erik Enge 05 Nov '03

05 Nov '03

How do you know that packages left on common-lisp.net and signed with my key are really signed by me when you install them on your system? A slightly edited discussion on #lisp: <emarsden> it might be worth having common-lisp.net be a certificate authority, that issues X509 certificates for the software that it hosts (and other trusted sources). Pyramid of trust rather than web, easier to get into for newcomers <kire> emarsden: sounds like a fine idea. <dan`b> well, the question for cl.net is "by signing this key, what are we saying about its owner, or the software he uploads?" <kire> my respons would be: we say nothing except that we believe this key belongs to the publisher of that piece of software <dan`b> not that I'm altogether convinced by the debian approach either of signing when you have some mestspace proof that the person is who they say they are <dan`b> because usually it's the net.persona that you're interested in <emarsden> you're saying "this tarball has been signed by someone who's known to cl.net" <emarsden> which avoids the "someone modified cliki.net to point to a nasty tarball" problem <dan`b> kire: the interesting question to the end-user is "did this package come from someone with a cl.net account" <dan`b> so how much authentication do you do before giving accounts on cl.net out? <kire> dan`b: none, really. <emarsden> yes, "is trusted sufficiently to have an account" is fine <emarsden> the barrier to entry should be low, otherwise people will just work around the certificate check <kire> emarsden: yes, it must be made very straightforward. <dan`b> though in fairness to the cryptohippies, I would probably sign them as "partially trusted" not "fully trusted" if it's just "trusted sufficiently to have an account" <dan`b> so, for the cl.net application procedure, you ask people to send you signed mail to apply <dan`b> and you send the inital username/password etc details encrypted to that same key <dan`b> then you know that the cl.net user is the owner of the gpg key, and you can sign the key in question What do you guys think? Personally, I'm all for it. Erik.

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